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WILLS, TRUSTS, AND ESTATES 
J. Rodney Johnson* 
The 1985 session of the General Assembly passed a number of 
bills dealing with wills, trusts, and estates, many of which resulted 
from the continuing law reform efforts of the Virginia Bar Associa-
tion's Committee on Wills, Trusts and Estates.1 In addition to this 
legislation, the Virginia Supreme Court decided six cases during 
the past year that involved issues of interest to both the general 
practitioner and the specialist in wills and trusts. This article re-
views all of these legislative and judicial developments. In order to 
facilitate the discussion of numerous code sections, they will be re-
f erred to in the text by their section numbers only, which will be 
understood as always referring to the latest printing of the old sec-
tions and to the 1985 supplement for the new sections. All refer-
ences to the Uniform Probate Code are to the 1982 publication. 
I. 1985 LEGISLATION 
A. Intestate Succession by Children2 
Section 64.1-1, Virginia's statute of descent, provides for a mar-
ried intestate's real estate to descend to the surviving spouse un-
less the intestate is survived by children or their descendants, one 
or more of whom are not children or their descendants of the sur-
viving spouse. In the latter case, as well as the case in which there 
is no surviving spouse, section 64.1-1 previously provided for real 
estate to descend "to the intestate's children" (subject to dower or 
* Professor of Law, T.C. Williams School of Law, University of Richmond; Member of the 
Virginia Bar; B.A., 1965, William and Mary; J.D., 1967, William and Mary; LL.M., 1970, 
New York University. 
1. The Association's recommended 1985 legislation was developed by an ad hoc subcom-
mittee under the able leadership of Professor John E. Donaldson, of the College of William 
and Mary, and was sponsored by Senator Thomas J. Michie, Jr. Valuable background infor-
mation and explanatory comments will be found in Donaldson, Law Ref arm-Suggested 
Revisions to Virginia's Wills Statutes: Part One, 9 VA. BAR Ass'N J. 4 (Spring 1983) [herein-
after cited as Donaldson, Part One]; Donaldson, Law Reform-Suggested Revisions to Vir-
ginia's Wills Statutes: Part Two, 9 VA. BAR Ass'N J. 10 (Fall 1983) [hereinafter cited as 
Donaldson, Part Two]. 
2. VA. CooE ANN.§ 64.1-1 (Cum. Supp. 1985). 
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curtesy if there is a surviving spouse). The 1985 amendment, which 
does not change the outcome of any case, merely adds the word 
"all" to the quoted language so that it now reads "to all the intes-
tate's children." 
B. Equitable Separate Estate3 
Section 64.1-21 has allowed a married woman to hold real estate 
free from the claims of a surviving husband's curtesy if the instru-
ment conveying the real estate to her contained certain language. 
In Jacobs v. Meade;' a statutory construction case noted later in 
this review,5 the Virginia Supreme Court held that under these 
same circumstances a married man could also hold real estate free 
from the claims of a surviving wife's dower. The 1985 amendment 
codifies the Jacobs' holding by rewriting section 64.1-21 to ex-
pressly recognize a married person's equitable separate estate in 
which a surviving spouse will not be entitled to dower or curtesy 
"if such right thereto has been expressly excluded by the instru-
ment creating the same," or "if such instrument ... describes the 
estate as his or her sole and separate equitable estate." This action 
represents the last nail to be driven into the coffin of interspousal 
property rights at death, and it also serves to emphasize that, 
under Virginia law, a surviving spouse has absolutely no rights in 
the deceased spouse's estate-except as the deceased spouse has 
allowed them to be created. 6 
C. Statutory Powers for Administrators7 
Section 64.1-57.1, which allows a circuit court to grant the boil-
erplate powers set forth in section 64.1-57 to "personal representa-
tives," was amended to provide that such term "shall encompass 
within its meaning the administrator of an intestate decedent's 
estate." 
3. Id. § 64.1-21. 
4. 227 Va. 284, 315 S.E.2d 383 (1984). 
5. See infra text accompanying notes 53-56. 
6. For a discussion of this point, see Johnson, Interspousal Property Rights at Death, 10 
VA. BAR Ass'N J. 10 (Summer 1984). 
7. VA. CODE ANN. § 64.1-157.1 (Cum. Supp. 1985). 
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D. Revocation of Wills8 
Section 64.1-58, dealing with the revocation of wills, was re-
pealed and replaced by section 64.1-58.1 for the primary purpose 
of changing the rule of Timberlake v. State Planters Bank.9 This 
case held that, although a testator's second will might contain a 
clause expressly revoking the first will, nevertheless no part of such 
second will, including the revocation clause, was operative during 
the testator's lifetime. Therefore, if that second will should itself 
be revoked by physical act or by declaratory revocation (i.e., a 
written revocation not contained in a will but which is executed 
with all of the formalities required for a will) during testator's life-
time, the first will would never have been revoked and thus would 
be admitted to probate. The new statute provides that, upon the 
execution of a will which expressly revokes a previous will, the pre-
vious will (and any codicil thereto) is thereby "void and of no ef-
fect." However, the same result is not reached in those cases where 
a latter will or codicil does not expressly revoke a prior will en-
tirely but instead (i) expressly revokes a part thereof, or (ii) con-
tains provisions inconsistent therewith. In these two instances the 
prior will remains unaffected unless the latter will or codicil "be-
comes effectual upon the death of the testator." The new statute 
retains the prior rule that a declaratory revocation or a physical 
act of revocation operates immediately. 
E. Partial Revocation by Divorce10 
Section 64.1-59, which provided that all provisions in a testator's 
will in favor of a testator's spouse were revoked by operation of law 
upon the testator's becoming divorced a vinculo matrimonii, has 
been expanded in scope by an amendment based upon Uniform 
Probate Code section 2-508. The amended statute provides that 
the revocation by operation of law will also apply to provisions 
conferring a special or general power of appointment upon the 
spouse or nominating the spouse to a fiduciary office, unless the 
will expressly provides otherwise. The provisions conferring a 
power or office upon the divorced spouse are interpreted, and re-
8. Id. § 64.1-58.1 (repealing id. § 64.1-58 (Repl. Vol. 1980)); see Donaldson, Part One, 
supra note 1, at 6-8. 
9. 201 Va. 950, 115 S.E.2d 39 (1960). 
10. VA. CODE ANN. § 64.1-59 (Cum. Supp. 1985); see also Donaldson, Part Two, supra 
note 1, at 11. 
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voked dispositions of property pass, as if the testator's spouse had 
predeceased the testator.11 In addition, section 64.1-59 now applies 
to annulments as well as divorces, and it provides that the provi-
sions of the will revoked solely by this section "shall" be revived 
upon the testator's remarriage to the former spouse. There are still 
no remedies in the following situations: (i) the case of a deserting 
spouse who is named as a beneficiary in the deceased spouse's will 
where there has been no final divorce, although section 64.1-23 
would bar a deserting spouse's rights as a tenant by dower, tenant 
by curtesy, distributee, or heir; and (ii) the case where the divorced 
or deserted decedent has neglected to eliminate the spouse as ben-
eficiary upon any life insurance policies. 
F. Revival of Wills 12 
Section 64.1-60, dealing with revival of revoked wills, was 
amended in order to provide that a will revoked under the new 
revocation statute, noted herein at "D," can be revived only by 
reexecution thereof or by a codicil thereto, and then only to the 
extent to which an intention to revive is shown. Prior to the 
amendment, such was the rule for a will revoked in any manner. 
The amendment thus allows for a will revoked by divorce to be 
revived by remarriage of the parties, as provided in newly amended 
section 64.1-59, noted herein at "E." 
G. Ademption by Extinction13 
Section 64.1-62.3 is a new section establishing several construc-
tional rules to provide presumptive solutions for certain cases, not 
covered by present law, where property specifically devised or be-
queathed by testator's will is not in testator's estate at the time of 
testator's death. The common law responds to such cases by apply-
ing a "specific asset" test which completely ignores testator's in-
tent. If the specific asset is not in the estate at testator's death, the 
gift simply fails or "adeems" by extinction. Although exceptions 
have been made where the absence of the original asset was due to 
11. Jones v. Brown, 219 Va. 599, 248 S.E.2d 812 (1978) (accord on the passage of 
property). 
12. VA. CODE ANN. § 64.1-60 (Cum. Supp. 1985); see also Donaldson, Part One, supra note 
1, at 6-8. 
13. VA. CODE ANN. § 64.1-62.3 (Cum. Supp. 1985); see also Donaldson, Part Two, supra 
note 1, at 13. 
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a change in form only,14 or to a disposition made while the testator 
was incompetent, 111 the basic rule has continued to govern most 
cases and to cause significant frustration of the testator's probable 
intent in some cases. A second matter addressed by this section is 
the problem of who receives accessions when, instead of specifically 
bequeathed property being absent at death, the testator has more 
than the quantity owned and referred to when the will was 
executed. 
Section 64.1-62.3.1, taken from the Uniform Probate Code sec-
tion 2-607(a), provides that a bequest of specific securities will not 
only include as much of the bequeathed securities as is part of the 
estate at the time of testator's death, but will also include any (i) 
additional or other securities of the same entity owned by the tes-
tator by reason of action initiated by the entity, except for any 
securities acquired by the exercise of purchase options, and (ii) any 
securities of another entity acquired with respect to the specific 
securities mentioned in the bequest as a result of a merger, consoli-
dation, reorganization or other similar action initiated by the 
entity.16 
Section 64.1-62.3.2, taken from the Uniform Probate Code sec-
tion 2-608(a), provides that a bequest or devise of specific property 
shall include the amount of any condemnation award for the tak-
ing of the property which remains unpaid at death and any pro-
ceeds unpaid at death on fire and casualty insurance on the 
property.17 
Section 64.1-62.3.3, taken from the Uniform Probate Code sec-
tion 2-608(b), provides that if, while testator is under a disability, 
14. See Skipwith v. Cabell, 60 Va. (19 Gratt.) 758 (1870). 
15. See VA. ConE ANN.§ 8.01-77 (Repl. Vol. 1984); Bryson v. Turnbull, 194 Va. 528, 74 
S.E.2d 180 (1953). 
16. The further provision in U.P.C. § 2-607(a) that such a bequest also includes "any 
additional securities of the entity owned by the testator as a result of a plan of reinvestment 
if it is a regulated investment company" was not proposed to the General Assembly. 
N.B. The distinction between a portion of the U.P.C. model not being proposed tO the 
General Assembly, instead of being considered and rejected by that body, will be of great 
importance when such legislation has to be interpreted by the courts. See Anderson, The 
Influence of the Uniform Probate Code in Nonadopting States, 8 U. PUGET SouND L. REv. 
599, 617-19 (1985). 
17. The further provisions in U.P.C. § 2-608(a) that such a bequest also includes "any 
balance of the purchase price (together with any security interest) owing from a purchaser 
to the testator at death by reason of sale of the property," and "property owned by testator 
at his death as a result of foreclosure, or obtained in lieu of foreclosure, of the security for a 
specifically devised obligation." were not proposed to the General Assembly. 
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(i) specifically devised or bequeathed property is sold by testator's 
conservator, guardian or committee, or (ii) proceeds of fire or casu-
alty insurance as to such property are paid to the :fiduciary, then 
the beneficiary shall be entitled to any of the remaining specific 
property plus a legacy in the amount of (i) the net sales price of 
the property sold, or (ii) the insurance proceeds. The net sales 
remedy is reduced by any amounts received under section 64.1-
62.3.2, and it does not apply if, after the sale or casualty, it is adju-
dicated that the testator's disability has ceased and the testator 
survives the adjudication by one year. The Uniform Probate Code 
recommendation, that this "substituted legacy" concept also apply 
when specifically devised or bequeathed property is taken by con-
demnation proceedings during testator's disability, was not pro-
posed to the General Assembly. The remedy under existing law in 
such cases, as well as other cases of involuntary disposition of an 
incompetent's property, is to give the intended beneficiary the pro-
ceeds still remaining in the estate at testator's death.16 The differ-
ence between a "substituted legacy" in some cases and the remain-
ing proceeds (if any) in other cases where specifically devised or 
bequeathed property is disposed of during a testator's disability 
cannot be justified. Further legislation is needed to eliminate these 
differing results. Such legislation might also consider the parallel 
problem presented when specifically devised or bequeathed prop-
erty is sold under a durable power of attorney during a testator's 
period of disability which, in the normal course of events, will not 
be an adjudicated disability. The present statute provides a rem-
edy only if a sale is made by a "conservator, guardian or 
committee." 
H. Ademption by Satisfaction 19 
Section 64.1-63, dealing with satisfaction of testamentary gifts, 
was repealed and replaced by section 64.1-63.1, which was taken 
from the first sentence of Uniform Probate Code section 2-612. 
Under the new statute, an inter vivos gift made by the testator to a 
beneficiary in the testator's will is not treated as a total or partial 
satisfaction of the beneficiary's devise or bequest unless: (i) the 
testator's will provides for the deduction of such gifts; (ii) the tes-
tator so declares his intent in a writing made contemporaneously 
18. See Bryson v. Turnbull, 194 Va. 528, 74 S.E.2d 180 (1953). 
19. VA. CODE ANN. § 64.1-63.1 (Cum. Supp. 1985) (repealing id. § 64.1-63 (Repl. Vol. 
1980)); see also Donaldson, Part Two, supra note 1, at 12-13. 
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with the gift; or (iii) the beneficiary acknowledges in a writing 
made at any time that the gift was in satisfaction. 
The remainder of Uniform Probate Code section 2-612, which 
was not proposed to the General Assembly, provides that, in cases 
of partial satisfaction, inter vivos gifts are to be valued at the ear-
lier of the time the beneficiary comes into possession or enjoyment 
of the property, or the testator's death. In the absence of a statu-
tory rule, it would appear that the case law result under section 
64.1-17-the statute dealing with the analogous problem of ad-
vancements in intestate succession-would provide persuasive au-
thority for the proposition that such a gift should be valued as of 
the date it is received by the beneficiary.20 
I. Anti-Lapse21 
Section 64.1-64, which has provided a presumptive solution for 
those cases in which a will has failed to anticipate the possibility of 
a beneficiary predeceasing a testator, has been repealed and re-
placed by section 64.1-64.1, the scope of which is narrower in sev-
eral respects. Although the new anti-lapse statute, which adopts 
the philosophy of the Uniform Probate Code section 2-605, contin-
ues (i) to operate in favor of the children and descendants of de-
ceased children of a predeceased beneficiary, (ii) to apply to void22 
gifts as well as lapsed gifts, and (iii) to apply to class gifts as well 
as individual gifts, it is now limited to those cases where the bene-
ficiary is a "grandparent or a descendant of a grandparent of the 
testator." The former statute applied to a gift to any beneficiary. 
The new rules continue to be presumptive and thus will yield in all 
respects to a contrary intention appearing in the will. 
The 1980 amendment, which made the anti-lapse statute appli-
cable to "the interest passing upon a termination of a testamentary 
trust" and to "an inter vivos trust which receives a devise or be-
quest such as contemplated in section 64.1-73" (the pour-over stat-
ute), has no counterpart in the new statute. However, there would 
appear to be nothing in the past or present statute to prevent it 
20. See Ratcliff v. Meade, 184 Va. 328, 35 S.E.2d 114 (1945); Chinn v. Murray, 45 Va. (4 
Gratt.) 348 (1848). 
21. VA. CODE ANN.§ 64.1-64 (Cum. Supp. 1985) (repealing id.§ 64.1-64 (Repl. Vol. 1980)); 
see also Donaldson, Part One, supra note 1, at 4-5. 
22. The common law defined a void gift as one where the beneficiary was dead at the time 
testator's will was executed; a lapsed gift was one where the beneficiary was alive at that 
time, but predeceased the testator. 
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from applying to the remainderman under a testamentary trust 
who predeceases the testator. The 1980 extension of the statute to 
inter vivos trusts that receive testamentary pour-overs was inten-
tionally left out of the new anti-lapse statute in favor of a direct 
amendment to the pour-over statute if a statutory solution to this 
problem is found to be necessary.23 
J. Passage of Lapsed Gifts24 
Section 64.1-65, which has provided part of the answer to the 
question concerning the proper takers of gifts not saved by the 
anti-lapse statute, was repealed and replaced by section 64.1-65.1, 
which provides a complete response to this problem following the 
general language of Uniform Probate Code section 2-606, except 
for the addition of a provision making these rules yield to a con-
trary intention appearing in the testator's will. These rules provide 
that non-residuary bequests or devises that lapse become a part of 
the residue, and, if there are multiple residuary beneficiaries, resid-
uary gifts that lapse pass to the other residuary beneficiaries in 
proportion to their interests in the residue. This legislation does 
not change existing Virginia law concerning the passage of lapsed 
gifts; it merely brings it all into one section. 
K. Blind Exercise of General Powers25 
Section 64.1-67, which created a presumption that the residuary 
clause of a testator's will was intended to exercise any general pow-
ers of appointment held by a testator, has been repealed and re-
placed by section 64.1-67.1, which provides that, absent a contrary 
intention appearing in the will, a residuary clause shall not exercise 
a power of appointment held by a testator. The new statute, which 
is based on Uniform Probate Code section 2-610, is the majority 
rule in the United States. In addition, it is probably more accu-
rately reflective of the typical donor's intent that, if the power is 
not specifically exercised by the donee, the appointive property 
should pass under the donor's well thought out gift in default 
rather than under the donee's "blind" exercise. 
23. See Donaldson, Part Two, supra note 1, at 15-16. 
24. VA. CODE ANN. § 64.1-65.1 (Cum. Supp. 1985) (repealing id. § 64.1-65 (Repl. Vol. 
1980)); see also Donaldson, Part One, supra note 1, at 5-6. 
25. VA. CODE ANN. § 64.1-67.1 (Cum. Supp. 1985) (repealing id. § 64.1-67 (Repl. Vol. 
1980)); see also Donaldson, Part Two, supra note 1, at 12. 
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L. Pretermitted Spouse26 
Section 64.1-69.1, taken from Uniform Probate Code section 2-
30l(a), provides a new remedy for those cases where a testator fails 
to provide by will for a surviving spouse who married the testator 
after the execution of the will. Since the repeal of former section 
64.1-58,27 which eliminated the rule that a single person's will was 
automatically revoked upon subsequent marriage, the only remedy 
of a pretermitted spouse would be to take dower or curtesy in the 
decedent's real estate under sections 64.1-19 to -44 and to re-
nounce the decedent's will under section 64.1-13 in order to take 
the statutory forced share in the decedent's personal estate as pro-
vided in section 64.1-16. The new rule provides that a pretermitted 
spouse "shall" take the same as if the decedent had died intestate, 
which will be the entire estate unless the decedent is survived by 
children or their descendants, one or more of whom are not chil-
dren or their descendants of the surviving spouse. In the latter 
case, the share of the surviving spouse will be one-third. 
Following its Uniform Probate Code model, the new statute pro-
vides that its remedy is not available to a pretermitted spouse if it 
appears from the will that the omission was intentional. However, 
the statute does not include the remainder of the language from 
Uniform Probate Code section 2-30l(a), providing that the remedy 
also is not available if "the testator provided for the spouse by 
transfer outside the will and the intent that the transfer be in lieu 
of a testamentary provision is shown by statements of the testator 
or from the amount of the transfer or other evidence." This omis-
sion may prove to be troublesome in some cases, but it is a prob-
lem that the knowledgeable draftsman should be able to avoid eas-
ily. Lastly, there is a policy problem with a system of laws that will 
allow a spouse who is omitted from a pre-marriage will to take the 
decedent's entire estate in some circumstances while the maximum 
that a surviving spouse who is omitted from a post-marriage will 
can receive is one-third of the decedent's real estate and one-half 
of decedent's personal estate. This policy problem becomes more 
acute in those cases where a marriage in the first instance is of 
relatively short duration and the survivor has made no economic 
26. VA. CODE ANN. § 64.1-69.l (Cum: Supp. 1985}; see also Donaldson, Part Two, supra 
note 1, at 10-11. 
27. 1956 Va. Acts 65 (repealing VA. CoDE ANN.§ 64-58 (Cum. Supp. 1956}}, as clarified by 
1968 Va. Acts 656 (enacting VA. CODE ANN.§ 64.1-58 (Repl. Vol. 1968)}. 
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contribution to the marital estate, as contrasted with a marriage in 
the second instance of long duration where the economic contribu-
tion of the surviving spouse may have been quite significant to the 
marital estate. It is suggested that the preferable solution to this 
policy problem is not to move backwards insofar as this new legis-
lation is concerned, but instead to move forward to deal more 
fairly with the surviving spouse in the second instance. 
M. Self-Proving Affidavits28 
Section 64.1-87.1, which sets forth the requirements of the affi-
davit used to make a will self-proving, previously required that the 
affidavit be made before an officer authorized to administer oaths 
"under the laws 9f this Commonwealth." The problem created by 
this quoted language when out-of-state self-proving wills were of-
fered for probate in Virginia has been addressed by the addition 
thereto of the words "or the laws of the state where acknowledge-
ment occurred." The problem is not yet solved however because, 
although the amendment will be applicable to all wills made self-
proved after July 1, 1985, the amendment is applicable to existing 
wills only if the existing wills were made self-proved prior to June 
1, 1977. Thus there is no coverage for foreign wills that were made 
self-proved between June 1, 1977, and July 1, 1985. 
Section 64.1-87.2, which was added in 1983 to provide an alter-
nate means of making a will self-proved, has also been amended to 
recognize affidavits made before officials authorized to administer 
oaths under the laws of the state where the acknowledgement oc-
curred. This alternate procedure, which dispenses with the need 
for the signature of the testator and witnesses, is not recommended 
for use by Virginia lawyers because it does not have the same ex-
tra-territorial recognition as does section 64.1-87.1, which parallels 
the language of Uniform Probate Code section 2-504(b). 
N. Payment of Small Trust Sums to Next of Kin29 
Section 64.1-123.3 is a new statute paralleling existing laws 
designed to facilitate probate avoidance where the only probate as-
sets in a decedent's estate are small deposits in banks, savings and 
28. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 64.1-87.1 and -87.2 (Cum. Supp. 1985); see also Donaldson, Part 
Two, supra note 1, at 17. 
29. VA. CODE ANN. § 64.1-123.3 (Cum. Supp. 1985). 
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loan associations, and credit unions. The new statute, which deals 
with cases wherein an amount not exceeding $5,000 is due the de-
cedent from a trust, provides that if there has been no qualification 
on the decedent's estate within sixty days after death, the trustee 
"may pay such sum to the distributees of the decedent or other 
person entitled thereto under the laws of this Commonwealth." 
0. Disbursements and Accountings in Small Estates30 
Section 8.01-606, dealing with the payment of small amounts to 
certain persons through court without intervention of a fiduciary 
and the parallel authority of commissioners of accounts, has been 
amended to increase the ceiling below which commissioners of ac-
counts can approve final distribution of funds from $500 to $2,500, 
to authorize commissioners of accounts to exempt fiduciaries from 
filing futher accounts when the value of the sum being adminis-
tered is less than $2,500, and to authorize circuit courts to exempt 
fiduciaries from filing further accounts when the value of the sum 
being administered does not exceed $4,000. 
P. Nuisance Bequests31 
On occasion a testator will bequeath one dollar or some other 
nominal sum to a beneficiary, not in order to confer a benefit upon 
such person but instead to demonstrate that the person was not 
accidentally omitted or, in some cases, to insult the recipient. As 
might be expected, such beneficiaries cannot always be counted on 
to cooperate with the personal representative in making settlement 
of the decedent's estate. Accordingly, section 2G-17, which requires 
that a personal representative making an accounting must exhibit 
vouchers for all disbursements made during the accounting period, 
has been amended to eliminate the need for a voucher when a dis-
bursement not exceeding twenty-five dollars is made to a legatee 
who refuses to take possession or fails to present the disbursement 
check to a bank for payment. A problem may be presented in some 
cases because the statute does not specify a time period that will 
be presumptive of a "failure" to present, as opposed to a mere "de-
lay" in presenting. By an amendment to section 64.1-65.1, it is fur-
ther provided that if a legatee refuses to take possession of such a 
bequest then the bequest shall fail and become a part of the resi-
30. Id. § 8.01-606. 
31. Id. §§ 26-17, 64.1-65.1. 
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due of the testator's estate. Although the amendment to section 
64.1-65.1 is addressed to the same problem as the amendment to 
section 26-17, the amendment to section 64.1-65.1 fails to address 
the problem of the legatee who receives the disbursement check 
but fails to present it to a bank for payment. Moreover, if the 
amendment to section 64.1-65.1 causes a refused bequest to fail 
and become a part of the residue, there would appear to be no 
need for the corresponding amendment to section 26-17 eliminat-
ing the need for a voucher from the legatee of the refused gift. 
Q. Fiduciary Compensation82 
The Virginia fiduciary compensation rule provides that a fiduci-
ary is entitled to "reasonable compensation" for the performance 
of the duties incumbent upon a particular fiduciary office. This 
rule, codified in section 26-30, has presented problems to fiducia-
ries in some instances, such as an administrator who, being 
charged only with a responsibility for a decedent's personal estate, 
nevertheless in the course of a competent and complete adminis-
tration of a decedent's affairs may render services in connection 
with decedent's real estate. As this real estate related service is be-
yond the legal scope of the administrator's fiduciary office, the 
traditional answer has been that the administrator was not allowed 
any compensation for these services, even though they were quite 
beneficial to the decedent's estate. The 1985 amendment to section 
26-30 remedies this problem by providing that "if a fiduciary ren-
ders services with regard to real estate owned by the ward or bene-
ficiary, compensation may also be allowed for the services rendered 
with regard to the real estate and the income therefrom or the 
value thereof." 
R. Fiduciary Investment88 
The "legal list" of fiduciary investments, contained in section 26-
40, has been expanded to include (i) accounts in credit unions in-
sured by the National Credit Union Share Insurance Fund or the 
Virginia Credit Union Share Insurance Corporation, up to the 
amount of such insurance, and (ii) certain governmental obliga-
tions subject to the obligation or right of the seller to repurchase at 
a future date. 
32. Id. § 26-30 (Repl. Vol. 1985). 
33. Id. § 26-40. 
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S. Gifts of Incompetent's Property by Substituted Judgment34 
The 1984 session amended section 37.1-142 to enable the circuit 
court, upon petition of a ward's fiduciary, to direct the fiduciary to 
make gifts from income and principal, not necessary for the ward's 
maintenance, to those persons to whom the ward would, in the 
court's judgment, have made such gifts if the ward were of sound 
mind. The process requires that a guardian ad litem be appointed 
for the incompetent, that reasonable notice be given to the ward 
and parties who would be affected by the proposed gifts, and that 
due consideration be given by the court to six enumerated factors 
plus any other factors relevant to the proposed gifts. The present 
amendment to section 37.1-142 authorizes the fiduciary to make 
such gifts not to exceed one hundred dollars per donee without 
court approval, appointment of a guardian ad litem, or notice, if 
the above-mentioned enumerated factors are considered and there 
is a finding that the ward has a history of giving similar gifts to a 
specific donee for three years prior to the appointment of the fidu-
ciary. The total of such gifts cannot exceed five hundred dollars in 
any calendar year. 
T. Probate Tax 315 
Section 58.1-1712 imposes a tax on the probate of every will or 
grant of administration on an intestate estate in the amount of ten 
cents per hundred dollars of probate property, with a minimum 
tax of one dollar. Estates not in excess of one hundred dollars have 
been exempt from this probate tax. Section 58.1-1712 has been 
amended to extend this exemption to estates not in excess of five 
hundred dollars. 
II. 1984-85 JUDICIAL DECISIONS 
A. Meaning of "Issue" in a Will 
In the case of Vicars v. Mullins,36 testator died in 1904 leaving a 
will that provided in part as follows: "I will my grandson W. S. 
Salyer also one third of all my Real Estate to be given him on the 
upper end of my farm and if he should die without issue, I 
34. Id. § 37.1-142 (Cum. Supp. 1985). 
35. Id. § 58.1-1712. 
36. 227 Va. 432, 318 S.E.2d 377 (1984). 
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then. ."37 W.S. Salyer died in 1956, survived by his illegitimate 
son whom he had also adopted. As stated by the court, "[t]he 
question for determination in this appeal is whether the illegiti-
mate son of a male devisee under a will is 'issue' of the devisee 
within the meaning of the will. "38 The court applied the common 
law canon of construction that generic descriptive language, such 
as "issue," presumptively excludes both illegitimates39 and 
adoptees, and then held that the evidence was insufficient to rebut 
this presumption in the case at bar. 
Although this case is valuable as a good explanation of prior law, 
it will have no application to wills of decedents dying after July 1, 
1978 (regardless of when executed), which will be governed by a 
statute passed in 1978 for the express purpose of reversing these 
common law presumptions.40 Moreover, although the new pre-
sumption is statutorily mandated only for wills of decedents dying 
after July 1, 1978, this would not prevent the court from constru-
ing earlier wills in accordance with its terms, as to both illegiti-
mates and adoptees, if so requested.41 
B. Illegitimates Proving Paternity in Intestate Succession 
Effective July 1, 1978, the absolute prohibition against inheri-
tance by, from, or through illegitimates on the paternal side was 
repealed in Virginia.42 However, the United States Supreme Court 
decision that led to this repeal also recognized that "[t]he more 
serious problems of proving paternity might justify a more de-
manding standard for illegitimate children claiming under their fa-
37. Id. at 434, 318 S.E.2d at 377. 
38. Id. 
39. In Virginia, this common law presumption was not applied when the gift was to the 
"children" of a female because a female's illegitimate children were placed on the same 
footing as her legitimate children. Bennett v. Toler, 56 Va. (15 Gratt.) 588 (1860). 
40. Section 64.1-71.1 provides as follows: 
Construction of generic terms.-In the interpretation of wills and trusts, adopted per-
sons and persons born out of wedlock are included in class gift terminology and terms 
of relationship in accordance with rules for determining relationships for purposes of 
intestate succession unless a contrary intent shall appear on the face of the will or 
trust. This section shall apply to all inter vivas trusts executed after July one, 
nineteen hundred seventy-eight and to all wills of decedents dying after July one, 
nineteen hundred seventy-eight, regardless of when executed. 
VA. CoDE ANN. § 64.1-71.1 (Repl. Vol. 1980). 
41. See Wheeling Dollar Savings and Trust Co. v. Hanes, 237 S.E.2d 499 (W. Va. 1977), 
for an instance of such retroactive application. 
42. 1978 Va. Acts 647. The background of this development is discussed in Johnson, In-
heritance Rights of Children in Virginia, 12 U. RICH. L. REV. 275 (1978). 
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thers' estates than that required either for illegitimate children 
claiming under their mothers' estates or for legitimate children 
generally."43 Picking up on this language, the General Assembly 
provided that, although a person born out of wedlock is a child of 
the mother, such a person is a child of the father only if the "pa-
ternity is established by clear and convincing evidence as set forth 
in section 64.1-5.2."44 This latter section excludes all evidence of 
paternity except for six specific actions or categories of conduct by 
the alleged father. 
In the recent case of Johnson v. Branson/" the only one of these 
six categories which was relevant was the following: "That he gave 
consent to a physician or other person, not including the mother, 
charged with the responsibility of securing information for the 
preparation of a birth record that his name be used as the father of 
the child upon the birth records of the child."46 The illegitimate's 
evidence consisted of a certified copy of his West Virginia birth 
certificate, which stated that the decedent was his father, and a 
copy of the relevant West Virginia law which stated that "if the 
child is illegitimate, the name or residence of, or other identifying 
details relating to, the putative father shall not be entered without 
his consent .... "47 Notwithstanding this statutory requirement of 
consent, the court held that, as there was no affirmative evidence 
before it that the decedent actually consented to have his name 
entered on the illegitimate's birth certificate, "the mere listing of 
[the decedent's] name on the West Virginia birth certificate is in-
sufficient to prove paternity under our statute requiring such proof 
to be made by clear and convincing evidence."48 
A major issue still to be decided in cases involving proof of pa-
ternity for purposes of intestate succession is the constitutionality 
of section 64.1-5.2, which limits the evidence that may be intro-
duced in such cases. This section was copied from section 20-61.l,49 
43. Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 762, 770 (1977). 
44. VA. CODE ANN. § 64.1-5.1(2)(b) (Rep!. Vol. 1980). Paternity may also be proven by 
establishing that "[t]he biological parents participated in a marriage ceremony before or 
after the birth of the child, even though the attempted marriage was prohibited by law, 
deemed null or void or dissolved by a court." Id. § 64.1-5.1(2)(a). 
45. 228 Va. 65, 319 S.E.2d 735 (1984). 
46. Id. at 69, 319 S.E.2d at 736 (quoting VA. CoDE ANN.§ 64.1-5.2.2 (Repl. Vol. 1980)). 
47. Id. (quoting W. VA. ConE § 14(h) (1931)). 
48. Id. at 71, 319 S.E.2d at 737. 
49. As it existed at the time of this 1978 copying, Va. Code Ann. § 20-61.1 consisted of the 
introductory paragraph and the first four numbered paragraphs of the version currently 
found in the code. 
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which limits the evidence of paternity that may be admitted in 
support proceedings. In the recent case of Jones u. Robinson/'0 the 
court struck down section 20-61.1 as unconstitutional because it 
denied certain illegitimates a reasonable opportunity to prove pa-
ternity. 51 In a telling portion of its opinion, the court wrote as 
follows: 
[O]nly illegitimate children whose fathers had lived with their 
mothers for the entire 10 months prior to birth or had affirmatively 
acknowledged their children in the narrowly restricted ways allowed 
by § 20-61.1 could establish their right to support. Children whose 
fathers avoided the acts described in § 20-61.1 could never recover 
support, even if the father openly admitted paternity in ways not 
specified in the statute. Allowable proof of paternity lay within the 
absolute control of the father, whose unwillingness to asstime volun-
tarily the obligation of support denied his illegitimate child a right 
which could not be denied a legitimate child. No meaningful device 
for establishing paternity was available to the illegitimate child. 
Such restrictions on the available methods of proof imposed an im-
penetrable barrier resulting in the kind of invidious discrimination 
contemplated by Gomez.52 
Granted that the right of support is different from the right of in-
heritance, the question remains whether or not that difference is 
sufficient to justify leaving "allowable proof of paternity .. 
within the absolute control of the father"53 in inheritance cases. 
C. Separate Equitable Estate for Males 
In Jacobs u. Meade54 a major issue was whether section 64.1-21, 
the statute recognizing the equitable separate estate of a female in 
which a surviving husband would not be entitled to curtesy, was 
unconstitutional on equal protection grounds because it granted 
rights to wives that were not granted to husbands. The court did 
not reach this constitutional issue because of section 64.1-19.1, 
which was enacted in 1977 as an apparent response to various deci-
50. 229 Va._, 329 S.E.2d 794 (1985) (consolidating sub. nom. Jones v. Robinson, White-
man v. Kelley, and Vivier v. Page). 
51. Id. at_, 329 S.E.2d at 801. The court's decision relates only to§ 20-61.1 as it existed 
prior to its expansion in 1982, which was the same language it contained in 1978, described 
supra note 49. 
52. Id. (referring to Gomez v. Perez, 409 U.S. 535 (1983)). 
53. Id. 
54. 227 Va. 284, 315 S.E.2d 383 (1984). 
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sions of the United States Supreme Court involving gender-based 
classifications. This section provides: "Where the word 'curtesy' 
appears in this chapter of the Code, it shall be taken to be synony-
mous with the word 'dower' as the same appears in this chapter or 
this Code, and shall be so construed for all purposes. "55 The court 
held that "when section 64.1-19.1 and section 64.1-21 are read to-
gether, it is manifest that a husband can acquire a sole and sepa-
rate equitable estate. "56 This holding was codified in the 1985 ses-
sion of the General Assembly by an amendment to section 64.1-
21.57 
Although section 64.1-19.1 can, in light of the Jacobs decision, 
be relied upon for guidance in dower/curtesy matters when rights 
are given to a husband but not a wife, or vice versa, a problem still 
remains when conflicting rights are given to husbands and wives. 
For example, one can create jointure which will eliminate a surviv-
ing wife's right to dower if the requirements of sections 64.1-29 and 
-30 are met. However, even though these same requirements are 
met, section 64.1-22 allows a surviving husband to renounce and 
take curtesy. Query: if "dower" and "curtesy" are synonymous, 
does this mean (i) that a surviving wife can renounce jointure, (ii) 
that a surviving husband can no longer renounce jointure, (iii) that 
these code sections are void because of their irreconcilable conflict, 
or (iv) none of the above? It is submitted that none of the above is 
the correct answer and that, if the concept of dower and curtesy is 
to be retained, a legislative overhaul of this chapter is the answer. 
D. Will Construction 
In Edwards v. Bradley,58 the issue before the court was whether 
certain language in a will created a fee simple or a life estate. Ap-
plying settled principles of law and rules of construction, the trial 
court's decision in favor of the life estate construction was upheld. 
E. Bona Fide Purchaser from an Apparent Heir 
In Cheatham v. Gregory,59 the court was concerned with the ap-
plication of section 64.1-95, which provides in relevant part as 
55. Id. at 286, 315 S.E.2d at 384 (quoting VA. ConE ANN. § 64.1-19.l (Repl. Vol. 1980)). 
56. Id. at 288, 315 S.E.2d at 385. 
57. See supra note 3. 
58. 227 Va. 224, 315 S.E.2d 196 (1984). 
59. 227 Va. 1, 313 S.E.2d 368 (1984). 
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follows: 
The title of a bona fide purchaser without notice for valuable con-
sideration from the heir at law of a person who has died . . . having 
title to any real estate of inheritance in the Commonwealth, shall 
not be affected by a devise of such real estate made by the decedent, 
unless within one year after testator's death the will devising the 
same . . . shall be filed for probate .... 110 
In a per curiam decision, the court determined on undisputed facts 
that the purchaser in question was a bona fide purchaser without 
notice for valuable consideration ($400) who was entitled to the 
protection of section 64.1-95, and reversed the trial court's decision 
to the contrary. 
F. Undue Infl,uence-Confidential Relationship-Constructive 
Fraud 
Nuckols v. Nuckols61 involved a bill of complaint brought by 
grantor's attorney in fact seeking rescission of several deeds of con-
veyance. Although this case involved deeds instead of wills, the ex-
cellent discussion of the undue influence presumption, confidential 
relationships between related parties, and constructive fraud 
makes this decision required reading for the lawyer preparing for a 
will contest case which involves these issues. 
60. Id. at 4, 313 S.E.2d at 370 (quoting VA. CODE ANN.§ 64.1-95 (Repl. Vol. 1980)). 
61. 228 Va. 25, 320 S.E.2d 734 (1934). 
